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AbstrAct: This paper deals with the asceticism as a strategy of environmental eth-
ics in the late modernity. This strategy can be observed in various political and 
civic initiatives as measure for reducing excess consumption as well as in various 
spiritual ecological practises. The extraordinary increase in the power of technol-
ogy extends our responsibility, limiting it at the same time to a negative kind of 
action, i.e. an action in which what should not be done is much more obvious 
than what should be done. The authors who examine the late modernity (Bruno 
Latour, Ulrich Beck) usually look for ‘technological’ or ‘institutional’ solutions to 
the ecological crisis, and the question of the responsible subject becomes only one 
of the variables in the risk management equation. This paper proposes to look for 
a solution to the crisis of responsibility by posing again a question on the genesis 
of the ethical subject through the lens of Michel Foucault’s concept of asceticism as 
‘technology of the self’.
Keywords: technology, responsibility, asceticism, self.
1. Introduction 
Environmental ethics extends the boundaries of traditional ethics, which is usu-
ally identified with immediate human activity in the interpersonal sphere. Tradi-
tionally, all dealings with the nonhuman world, that is, with the natural world and 
the entire realm of techne, were ethically neutral. However, facing the reality of the 
ecological problems caused by the increased power of technology, environmental 
ethics embraces the relationship between human activity and the environment: it 
refuses the sharp distinction between nature and human being, revises the extent 
of the responsibility of the individual and collective ethical agent, and reconsiders 
the nature of the ethical practice.
In the wide field of public discourse considering environmental ethics, we find a 
number of references to asceticism, restraint or self-limitation as the only possible eth-
ical practice. It is not only philosophers who urge us to seek “a consensus to sharply 
reduce our habits of excessive consumption, to lower our celebrated ‘Western’ stan-
1 This research was funded by a grant (No. S-MOD-17-5) from the Research Council of 
Lithuania.
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dard of living of recent times”2. This exhortation also reverberates in political rhetoric 
and international agreements, for example, in the Kyoto protocol (the commitment to 
reduce emissions) (1997), the Paris climate agreement (an action plan to limit global 
warming “well below” 2 degrees Celsius) (2015), etc. In turn, some environmentalists 
have doubts as to whether the ascetic strategy is appropriate for the modern world. 
For example, Ozzie Zehner states that the ascetic and self-sacrificing strategy is inef-
fective because it requires too much of us: “even though the long-term risks of climate 
change are widely acknowledged in public discourse, it’s difficult for citizens to mo-
bilize changes to their individual behaviour in response to such nebulous concerns. 
Concerned citizens may lionize sacrifices for being noble, even virtuous, but as a so-
ciety we unsympathetically ignore them in practice”3. In essence, this apprehension 
is repeated by Naomi Klein, recalling Jimmy Carter’s speech (1979)4 as a failure of 
the ascetic policy: any politician who asks voters to make sacrifices to solve an envi-
ronmental crisis is on a suicide mission5. Nevertheless, we can also see many ascetic 
initiatives that are spontaneously evolving, and subsequently more widespread: from 
zero waste movement6 to various spiritual ecological practices7. 
2 H. Jonas, Mortality and Morality: A Search for the Good after Auschwitz, Evanston, North-
western University Press, 1996, p. 109.
3 O. Zehner, Green Illusions. The Dirty Secrets of Clean Energy and the Future of Environmen-
talism, Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 2012, p. 179.
4 “I ask Congress to give me authority for mandatory conservation and for standby gasoline 
rationing. To further conserve energy, I’m proposing tonight an extra ten billion dollars over the 
next decade to strengthen our public transportation systems. And I’m asking you for your good 
and for your nation’s security to take no unnecessary trips, to use carpools or public transporta-
tion whenever you can, to park your car one extra day per week, to obey the speed limit, and 
to set your thermostats to save fuel. Every act of energy conservation like this is more than just 
common sense, I tell you it is an act of patriotism”: J. Carter, Energy and the National Goals – A 
Crisis of Confidence, retrieved from https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jimmycarter-
crisisofconfidence.htm (accessed May 8th, 2019).
5 N. Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate, New York, London, To-
ronto, Sydney, New Delhi, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2014, p. 102.
6 The term ‘zero waste’ was coined in the 1970s by the chemist Paul Palmer who engineered 
ways to reuse chemicals leftover from the electronic technology industry by mixing them into 
useful, sellable blends. Palmer promoted ways to redesign systems of production so that waste 
outputs from one process served as usable inputs for another (See P. Palmer, Getting to Zero 
Waste, Sebastopol (CA), Purple Sky Press, 2005). Since the 1970s, this term is evolving as it is 
coming more widely used in the fields of policy and behavioural change (see Global Alliance 
for Incineration Alternatives (GAIA), On the Road to Zero Waste: Successes and Lessons from 
Around the World, 2012, retrieved from http://www.no-burn.org/wp-content/uploads/On-the-
Road-to-Zero-Waste.pdf, accessed May 8th, 2019; R. Peterson, Trash Radicals: Sustainability’s 
New Ascetic Ideal, in “National Association of Scholars”, 2014, February 27, retrieved from 
https://www.nas.org/articles/trash_radicals_sustainabilitys_new_ascetic_ideal, accessed May 
8th, 2019). It is important to emphasize that zero waste movement or lifestyle is not about re-
cycling and reusing of resources, it is about preventing waste and reducing consumption (See 
B. Johnson, Zero Waste Home: The Ultimate Guide to Simplifying Your Life by Reducing Your 
Waste, New York, Scribner, 2013).
7 See K. T. Kramer, Eco-Asceticism: Preparing for the Future through Discipline Today, in 
“America: The Jesuit Review”, 2007, November 5, retrieved from https://www.americama-
gazine.org/issue/632/faith-focus/eco-asceticism (accessed May 8th, 2019); Metropolitan John 
Filosofia     EnVironmEntal Ethics as an ascEtic practicE in thE agE of tEchnology  71
However, not everyone agrees that this ascetic zeal looks like an expression of 
responsibility. Bruno Latour in his paper “It’s development, stupid! or: How to 
Modernize Modernization” writes:
if we look back at our own history with this [modernist] narrative, it appears to us as 
a monstrosity, as something so horrible, so contradictory that we seem to have no way 
out of it except by converting ourselves suddenly to asceticism and repentance. This 
is the time when Atlas is submitted to the Great Temptation: “I should not have taken 
the whole Earth on my back. I am going to withdraw”.8
Latour’s ironic remark on our desperate attempt to turn back time suggests that 
this French philosopher considers the turn to asceticism in late modernity as a 
temptation rather than a responsibility. In the age of technology, we cannot simply 
abandon our technological monsters and their unintended consequences.
Therefore, in my paper, I will try to examine what hides behind the asceti-
cism in the age of technology. Do we face here the awareness of the extent of 
environmental problems and the responsibility that forces all society to change 
the direction of its development or, on the contrary, deal with powerlessness 
and fear of responsibility? In subsequent sections, I will argue that asceticism as 
well as its critique can reveal themselves as particular strategies of environmental 
ethics when the question of the ethical agent and its responsibility in the age of 
technology is concretized. However, this concretization is a daunting task. Can 
we answer who is responsible, where does the responsibility lie? Is it with those 
who generate ecological problems, those who benefit from them, those who are 
potentially affected by them, or with the public institutions? Or perhaps we 
should take into account the transformation of the notion of responsibility itself 
and avoid considering the ethical agent as simply a natural pre-given entity (in 
the sense of the legal entity as enshrined in human rights), but to look more 
closely at the issue of its constitution.
2. Asceticism and the Crisis of the Subject of Responsibility
Both the supporters of the ascetic strategy and its opponents agree that, to a 
certain extent, the announcement of asceticism is an expression of the crisis of re-
sponsibility. Hans Jonas, one of the most significant contributors to philosophical 
reflection on science, technology, and ethics, notes that in the age of technology 
the scale of responsibility expands because of the unprecedentedly increased and 
accumulated power of technology. We must take responsibility as far as the effects 
(Zizioulas) of Pergamon Ecological Asceticism: A Cultural Revolution, in “Orthodox Outlet for 
Dogmatic Enquiries”, 2009, retrieved from http://www.oodegr.com/english/koinwnia/perival-
lon/Ecological_asceticism.htm (accessed May 8th, 2019).
8 B. Latour, It’s development, stupid! or: How to Modernize Modernization, p. 10. Retrieved 
from http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/107-NORDHAUS&SHELLENBERGER.
pdf (accessed May 8th, 2019).
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of this power are concerned. However, on the other hand, the new level of tech-
nological power does not allow us to clearly define and control its effects. Nuclear 
power, the impact of biotechnology, the depletion of natural resources, rainforest 
deforestation have long-term and unpredictable consequences, and endanger the 
future of mankind and other species. These threats lead to the paralysis of action 
(renunciation of action or renunciation in action), where it is unclear how the re-
sponsible practice should take shape. In such a situation, it is much more obvious 
what should not be done than what should be done. A similar aspect is noted by 
the German sociologist Ulrich Beck. He takes note of the “spacio-temporal gap 
between actions and their impacts”9. Contemporary environmental hazards such 
as ozone depletion, damage to the reproductive and immune system of species or 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have not arisen as symptoms until the 
years they began their impact as invisible effects of specific actions. Therefore, 
this cumulative effect of our actions does not allow us to clearly assess the scope 
of our responsibility and to decide which action would be more appropriate in 
the presence of ecological hazards. As Timothy Clark has observed, “the greater 
the number of people engaged in modern forms of consumption then the less the 
relative influence or responsibility of each but the worse the cumulative impact of 
their insignificance”10.
The crisis of the agent of responsibility (personal or collective) leads towards the 
change of the notion of responsibility itself. The subjective autonomous actor’s re-
sponsibility that focuses on his or her actions (responsibility as being accountable 
for one’s deeds) finds itself in tension with another notion of responsibility, that 
is, with responsibility for the matter that has a claim on one’s acting, i.e., the re-
sponsibility for the things entrusted to one’s care, for something that is in the field 
of one’s power and influence, that depends on him or her and that he or she can 
harm (the responsibility for particular objects that commits an agent to particular 
deeds concerning them). 
Thus, here I mean the tension between formal (or legal) responsibility, which 
allows us to assign actions to the actor with reference to a causal connection, 
and a positive, purpose-oriented responsibility, defined by what is to be done11. 
In the first case, responsibility is based on the priority of the agent of respon-
sibility: he or she is clearly defined, operates freely and independently. In the 
second case, on the contrary, due to the operation of the accumulated technol-
ogy, it is not easy to indicate the consequences of the actions, unless we speak 
about the dangers they posed, and clearly identify the agent of the action. Hans 
9 U. Beck, Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research Programmes, in The Risk 
Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory, ed. by B. Adam, U. Beck and J. Loon, Lon-
don- New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, 2000, p. 220.
10 T. Clark, Derangements of Scale, in Telemorphosis. Theory in the Era of Climate Change, 
vol. I, ed. by Th. Cohen, Open Humanities Press, 2012, pp. 148-166: 150.
11 H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search for an Ethics for the Technological Age 
(1979), Engl. transl. by H. Jonas with the collaboration of D. Herr, Chicago & London, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 90-93.
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Jonas sees here the difference between formal and substantial responsibility, 
while Ulrich Beck announces the crisis of traditional notion of responsibility. 
He invokes the quite paradoxical concept of ‘organized irresponsibility’. Ac-
cording to Beck, on the one hand, the institutions of late modern society must 
unavoidably acknowledge the reality of catastrophe, on the other hand, they 
simultaneously deny its existence, hide its origins, and preclude compensa-
tion or control12. Consequently, we are environed by an ambient hum of guilt, 
easily faded out, because no individual or institution seems to be held specifi-
cally accountable for anything. We have here a kind of ‘negative socialization’13 
predicated essentially on dependence on hazards that elude judgement and 
decisions. In other words, faced with unintended and unknown side effects, 
late modern society becomes reflexive not so much in terms of responsibility as 
in terms of risk management.
Both Jonas and Beck are trying to solve the issue of the agent of responsibil-
ity by appealing to the sphere of public policy. According to Jonas, “knowl-
edge, will and power are collective, and therefore control of them must also 
be collective: it can come only from the forces within the public sector”14. Of 
course, one can think of politicians’ responsibility, raising public awareness, 
and preventive asceticism in order to avoid undesirable consequences at any 
cost (for example, Jonas’ disapproval of genetic engineering by appealing to 
irreversible changes), but how to avoid a situation where no one is specifically 
responsible for anything? Beck, following Jonas’ idea, proposes a set of tactical 
or procedural solutions. Beck mentions a few items: 1) consequences must be 
publicly debated before decisions that produce them are taken; 2) perpetra-
tors must be compelled to prove that their production is non-hazardous; 3) 
strongest ally of the authoritarian technocracy must be mobilized and draw 
over to the side of life and future; 4) a division of power is required between 
research and applications, between diagnosis of hazards and therapeutic safety 
measures15, and so on. As we can see, the solutions offered by Beck are at least 
partially ‘managerial’16, that is, all they are essentially directed towards search-
ing for the proper functioning of the institutions, while the question of the 
ethical subject/actor is removed from the agenda. More specifically, for Beck, 
the process of individualisation in late modernity has the ironic-tragic dimen-
sion because it is the individual who is severed from the decision contexts but 
always is the recipient of the residual risk:
12 U. Beck, Risk Society Revisited, cit., p. 224.
13 Idem, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (1988), Engl. transl. by A. Weisz, Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1995, p. 52.
14 H. Jonas, Mortality and Morality, cit., p. 109.
15 U. Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, cit., pp. 170-171: 178.
16 Here I use the term ‘management’ in its traditional sense: it refers to the activities involved 
in five general functions or elements – planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, con-
trolling. See H. Fayol, General and Industrial Management (1916), Engl. transl. by C. Storrs, 
London, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1948.
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whatever propels risk and makes it incalculable, whatever provokes the institutional 
crisis at the level of the governing regime and markets, shifts the ultimate decision-
making responsibility onto the individuals, who are ultimately left to their own de-
vices with their partial and biased knowledge, with undecidability and multiple layers 
of uncertainty.17
According to Ino Rossi, Beck makes a distinction between reflective indi-
vidual of the first modernity and reflexive individual of the risk society of the 
second or late modernity; the latter subject is rather a quasi-subject who at the 
same time is the producer and the outcome of its own boundaries: “[...] indi-
vidual is forced to make many choices at great speed without existing models, 
he acts like a reflex or an interminable producer of indeterminate and immedi-
ate reflexes: deals, networks and alliances that are continuously constructed, 
combined and recombined”18. Moreover, the hazards of risk society (climate 
change and garbage crisis) are also considered by Beck as quasi-subjects, that 
is, as powerful, uncontrollable ‘actors’ that delegitimize and destabilize state 
institutions with responsibilities for pollution control19. Thus, taking into ac-
count the specifics of Beck’s sociological analysis, we must state that responsi-
bility is increasingly taken to be perceived as a risk management process and, 
consequently, the personal responsibility is replaced by global social risk man-
agement mechanisms20. However, we should remember here Jacques Derrida, 
who, in an interview with French historian and philosopher François Ewald, 
spoke about “singular responsibility without which there would be no moral-
ity, law or politics”21. 
So, I would like to pose the question about the responsible agent from a differ-
ent angle: does the new notion of responsibility – responsibility for the matter that 
has a claim on my acting (or, in terms of Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricoeur, re-
sponsibility for the vulnerable other, potential victim of my action), responsibility 
for the future vulnerability of humanity and its environment – presupposes consti-
tution of responsible agent? If so, how can we escape the false ‘alibi’ of ‘organized 
irresponsibility’ and the temptation of ‘managerial’ solution? 
17 U. Beck, World at Risk (2007), Engl. transl. by C. Cronin, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009, 
p. 195.
18 I. Rossi, Reflexive Modernization, in Ulrich Beck: Pioneer in Cosmopolitan Sociology and 
Risk Society, ed. by U. Beck, New York City, Springer, 2014, p. 61.
19 U. Beck, Risk Society Revisited, cit., p. 225.
20 On the other hand, Beck calls for a paradigm shift within sociology: “every modelling of 
uncertainty remains under the spell of the tradition of risk analysis and risk management which 
has its roots in classical security research and is driven by the concern to achieve a socially ac-
ceptable and efficient ‘managing’ of uncertainty. [...] The primary focus for the present must be 
on the global social constitutive conditions of risk and not on coping with their consequences” 
(Idem, World at Risk, cit., p. 52).
21 R. Kearney, Derrida’s Ethical Re-turn, in Working through Derrida, ed. by G. B. Madison, 
Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1993, pp. 28-50: 28.
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3. The Notion of Asceticism
To answer these questions, let’s go back to the aforementioned ascetic strategy. 
Should we understand asceticism only as a negative kind of action that indicates 
the crisis of the subject of responsibility? Or maybe, on the contrary, the ascetic 
strategy could serve as a positive strategy in its constitution? Therefore, we should 
start with the very notion of asceticism. The authors mentioned above (especially 
the critics of asceticism) understand asceticism as a practice of self-denial and sac-
rifice. Meanwhile, I think we should go beyond this common usage of this term. In 
this paper I would like to emphasize asceticism more as a reflective practice that 
changes the way of life and creates what we can call subjectivity.
According to Geoffrey Galt Harpham, we can make a distinction between 
‘tight’ and ‘loose’ senses of asceticism: “in the tight sense asceticism is a product 
of early Christian ethics and spirituality; in the loose sense it refers to any act of 
self-denial undertaken as a strategy of empowerment or gratification”22. In the con-
text of modernity, we should mention Max Weber’s concept of “rationally active 
asceticism” which means the striving to master the world and “to tame what is 
creatural and wicked through work in a worldly ‘vocation’”23. That would be the 
‘inner-worldly asceticism’. In a sense, it is the asceticism from which the spirit of 
capitalism was born. 
Seeing that asceticism in the loose sense includes the way in which societies op-
erate hegemonically and with those who resist, I invoke a more neutral concept of 
asceticism that I found in the later philosophy of Michel Foucault. Foucault takes 
asceticism in a more general sense than that attributed to it by Weber, but along 
the same lines. He comprehends “asceticism in a very general sense – in other 
words, not in the sense of morality of renunciation but as an exercise of the self 
on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain 
to a certain mode of being”24. So, asceticism is not primary and fundamentally 
renunciation, it involves, rather, acquiring something through ‘exercises’, through 
‘training’. Foucault emphasizes the generative function of asceticism which is pro-
duction of subjectivity: “we must acquire something we do not have, rather than 
renounce this or that element of ourselves that we are or have. We must acquire 
something that, precisely, instead of leading us gradually to renounce ourselves, 
will allow us to protect the self and to reach it”25.
22 G.G. Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1987, p. XIII.
23 M. Weber, Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions (1920), in From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated, edited and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 325. Retrieved from https://archive.org/stream/
frommaxweberessa00webe#page/324/mode/2up (accessed May 8th, 2019).
24 M. Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. by P. Rabinow, Engl. transl. by R. Hurley 
and others, New York, The New York Press, 1997, p. 282.
25 M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–
1982, Engl. transl. by G. Burchell, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 320.
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In these discussions on the concept of asceticism we can see an effort to oppose 
the asceticism understood in a narrow sense (or, in Weber’s terms, ‘world-rejecting 
asceticism’). The narrow understanding of asceticism is limited to self-denial; to 
rejection of one or another element of our selves (it means withdrawal from pos-
session of worldly goods, from political, economic, artistic activities and so forth). 
At the same time, it supposes pre-given and identical selfhood. Asceticism, as it 
is interpreted by Foucault, in late or reflective modernity, transforms itself from 
an active production of agent-subject to “a process of self overcoming that opens 
possibilities for movements of differing rather than the continued movement of 
purification that is insistence upon the identity of the same”26.
It should be noted, however, that Foucault’s concept of asceticism as ‘technology 
of the self’ does not escape the ambiguity that lies in the very concept of ‘technol-
ogy’. On the one hand, such practices in each civilization are offered to individuals 
in order to define their identity: to some extent, everyone is constituted as particu-
lar congeries of the ‘effects’ of the networks of power. Thus individuals connect 
themselves to the requirements of a socio-political system. But, on the other hand, 
these practices also acquire the character of emancipation from this system and 
create the new forms of the self: if we become aware of the history of what we have 
been, we thereby open the space for “the undefined work of freedom”27.
4. Asceticism as the Process of Self-transformation and Reflective Critique
Therefore, I will move to the question of ethical subject/agent constitution as 
ascetical practice of self-transformation in Foucault’s philosophy. Foucault’s ap-
proach to the ethical subject is quite paradoxical. According to American phi-
losopher Judith Butler, Foucault believes that we must avow an error as constitu-
tive of who we are. In other words, the ethical subject/agent is constituted by the 
awareness of self-deficiency: “what conditions our doing is a constitutive limit, for 
which we cannot give a full account, and this condition is, paradoxically, the basis 
of our accountability”28. Thereby, Foucault constantly emphasizes that our power 
to reflect on ourselves has a price. It can be assumed that Foucault here means that 
each self-reflection, turning itself into an ‘object of knowledge’, at the same time, 
provides awareness of the loss or extinction of something that avoids the ‘tentacles’ 
of the cognitive means available in the current discourse. By realizing this, we ac-
quire a responsibility rather than an ‘alibi’. According to Butler, 
giving account of oneself comes at a price not only because the “I” that I present 
cannot present many of the conditions of its own formation but because the “I” that 
26 L. McWhorter, Asceticism/Askesis: Foucault’s Thinking Historical Subjectivity, in Ethics 
and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought, ed. by A. B. Dallery, Ch.E. Scott and 
P. H. Roberts, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 243-254: 253.
27 M. Foucault, Ethics, cit., p. 316.
28 J. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, New York, Fordham University Press, 2005, p. 111.
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yields to narration cannot comprise many dimensions of itself: the social parameters 
of address, the norms through which the “I” becomes intelligible, the non-narrative 
or even unspeakable dimensions of the unconscious that persist as an enabling for-
eignness at the heart of my desire.29
If we accept the existing forms of rationality as a matter of course, we forget or 
deny the price we pay (and hence the responsibility). Therefore, both the forms of 
rationality and the practices of behaviour require constant problematization and 
reflective distance. The latter could even be called ‘the ethical distance’, because it 
creates a dynamic self-identity, which is not limited to actions or defined functions, 
but is sensitive to the new challenges and threats.
What happens when we place the question of the subject’s constitution in the situ-
ation of the age of technology? Such localization of the question does not isolate it; 
and the problematization, which implies a reflective relationship with our present, 
is based on the relation with the previous postulates or principles and future tasks. 
Let’s take a closer look at one of the transformations of modernity that emerged in 
Foucault’s ‘history of subject’, that is, the transformation of the imperative “take care 
of the self” into the imperative “know yourself”. According to Foucault, the care of 
the self or concern for the self (epimeleia heautou) has been understood by ancient 
philosophers as a gamut of activities, practices and duties that requires time, atten-
tion, repetition, exercises of body and spirit. The care of the self was inseparable from 
the relationship with the truth: “for the subject to have right of access to the truth 
he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a 
certain point, other than himself”30. However, the transformation that has taken place 
in modernity has limited the relation with the truth: the evidence of the knowledge of 
oneself has gained importance, while the relationship with the truth as a practice of 
the self-formation and transformation was left without attention. This is the price we 
pay for our ability to reflect on ourselves. For Foucault, the equation of philosophical 
asceticism with renunciation of feeling, solidarity, and care for one’s self and for oth-
ers (as the price of knowledge) was one of our biggest wrong turnings31. However, he 
does not interpret this fracture as something that has happened once and for all and 
does not urge to return to the ancient world. For Foucault, it is more important to 
show the contingency of each solution, its integral relation to the problems of its own 
time, but also the possibility of an undefined work of freedom that lies in it.
Therefore, the general formulation of the problem, “the constitution of respon-
sibility in the age of technology”, which was the starting point for Jonas’ reflections, 
threatens to become empty in Foucault’s case, if we interpret it as a search for a 
universal answer or solution that can be achieved through technical-administrative 
means rather than as a problematization that promotes the formation of multiple 
behavioural strategies and solutions, often quite marginal.
29 Ibidem, p. 135.
30 M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, cit., p. 15.
31 P. Rabinow, Introduction. The History of Systems of Thought, in M. Foucault Ethics, cit., 
pp. XI-XLV: XXV.
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These multiple behavioural strategies can work as resistance practices. For ex-
ample, Éric Darier, following the analysis of Foucault’s resistance strategies in the 
field of environmental movement32, seeks to show how resistance strategies can 
direct not only the development of alternative practices of the self, but also deeper 
critique of consumer system: 
it is through practical opposition to a new landfill site or incinerator that individuals 
and communities may start questioning the conditions which have led to a “garbage 
crisis”. Household recycling can be one technical alternative which transforms indi-
vidual subjectivity from “wasteful” consumer to recycling Green consumer. How-
ever, it could also lead one to re-question the entire process of consumerism, and why 
and how individuals are seduced by it.33
Even though Foucault’s notion of asceticism as exercises of the self does not 
provide a ready-made response, and does not protect against mistakes, it illustrates 
how helplessness that we feel when faced with the hazards of the age of technology 
can be transformed into a few purposeful practices of responsibility. Our practices 
(such as responsible shopping, responsible energy consumption) should be moti-
vated not by the abstract risk of ‘global warming’ or ‘global garbage crisis’, but, for 
example, by our unwillingness to identify ourselves with wasteful consumers. The 
success of these strategic practices is always contextual and requires constant revis-
ing, but it is this vigilant tension that enables the process of the self-transformation.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I wanted to show that asceticism as a strategy of environmental 
ethics in the age of technology should not be confined to a negative action, i.e. to 
self-denial or self-restraint. Asceticism, as a practice of the self, allows us to open 
the possibilities of positive responsible action. I perceive these possibilities as an 
alternative to responsibility, limited to the managerial or technological solutions 
offered by Ulrich Beck, Bruno Latour and, in part, Hans Jonas. Of course, ap-
propriate managerial and technological solutions at the national and global levels 
could allow us to cope with ecological threats and integrate nature within the fab-
ric of society, but whether such a project would not be illusory if the question of 
the constitution of responsible subject remained unresolved.
32 Although Foucault was rather indifferent or even critical of the ecological movement, 
seeing it as contradictory (on the one hand, he noticed its hostility to science and technology, 
on the other hand, its scientific reasoning), but his position allows me to develop what I called 
environmental ethics as ascetic practice in the age of technology.
33 É. Darier, Foucault against Environmental Ethics, ed. by É. Darier, Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1999, pp. 217-240: 234.
